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Discovery in Libel Cases Involving




The question of what type of information plaintiffs should be
able to acquire during discovery in a libel suit involving the news
media has been a source of tension for many years. Plaintiffs con-
tend that access to news organizations' editorial processes and confi-
dential sources is imperative to meet their burden of proof,' particu-
larly when actual malice must be demonstrated. The news media
argue that access to the editorial process will chill the internal dis-
cussion of stories, since anything said can be discovered and admit-
ted in trial.' A result of this decreased discussion might be erroneous
reporting because some inaccuracies could go unchallenged.4 Simi-
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I. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (libel plaintiffs should have access to
all non-confidential, non-published information); Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120
N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980) (news organizations must disclose the identity of confidential
sources to libel plaintiffs after the plaintiff makes an offer of proof regarding validity of the
claim).
2. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-70 (1979). See infra note 31-68 and accom-
panying text for an examination of Herbert; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan defines actual malice as a published statement that is either known
to be false by the publisher at the time of communication, or is made in reckless disregard for
the truth. Id. at 279-80. Public officials are required to prove actual malice in order to prevail
in a libel suit. Id. The Court has extended this requirement to public figures. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
3. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979).
4. Id. at 173-74. The editorial process is a microcosm of the Holmesian marketplace
of ideas, where the accuracy of a story is tested by discussing all available information. Re-
quiring disclosure damages this marketplace because editors and news organization attorneys
will warn against candid, forceful discussion of stories if such statements may be used against
the organization in a libel action. See generally Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.
1985), reh'g granted, vacated in part, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Tavoulareas, the
Washington Post published a story stating that the president of Mobil Oil, William Tavou-
lareas, used his influence to set up his son Peter in the shipping business. During discovery,
larly, the media assert that the identity of confidential sources should
be protected so as not to deter future sources from disclosing infor-
mation. 5 If access to confidential news sources is inhibited, it is ar-
gued that public access to information will be reduced.'
The United States Supreme Court has not been silent on these
issues. In Herbert v. LandoJ the Court refused to grant protection to
news organizations' editorial processes, holding that a libel plaintiff
must be allowed to explore editorial decisions, including the state of
mind of reporters and editors, through the discovery process. 8 In
Branzburg v. Hayes,9 the Court, in a criminal setting, 10 required
three reporters to disclose the identity of confidential sources before
a federal grand jury," rejecting the concern that disclosure would
deter future sources from coming forward. 2 While four justices lim-
ited their holding specifically to federal grant juries,13 five justices,
applying two standards, recognized the existence of some type of
reporter's privilege.
Both cases involved the need for information directly related to
the heart of the claim.15 In Branzburg, reporters knew the identity of
people who might have committed a crime.' 6 The purpose of the
grand jury proceedings was to determine if criminal charges should
be filed against those individuals.17 The information, therefore, was
Tavoulareas learned that a Post copy editor had written a memo stating that the story was
difficult to believe, although the editor did not have the full information possessed by the re-
porter. Tavoulareas used the memo at trial, arguing it demonstrated that the Post entertained
serious doubts about the truth of the story before it was published. Tavoulareas, 759 F.2d at
114-17. The Post, however, argued that the copy editor's statement was uninformed hyperbole.
Id.
5. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972).
6. Id. The Court declined to follow that reasoning and questioned the legitimacy of
the idea. Id. at 690-91.
7. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
8. Id. at 172-74.
9. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
10. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences
between criminal and civil cases when the identity of a confidential source is sought.
I1. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-80, 708-09.
12. Id. at 681-83.
13. Id. at 667-709 (Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Black-
mun and Rehnquist).
14. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text for an examination of the various
Branzburg opinions.
15. "Heart of the claim" is one standard of review used by courts to determine whether
to order discovery in both non-confidential, non-published information cases and confidential
source cases. See infra notes 87-93 and 148-55 and accompanying text. The Court did not
explicitly adopt that standard.
16. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-80. One reporter was allowed to photograph the
production of hashish on the condition that the substance's manufacturer remain anonymous.
Id. at 667-68. A second reporter gained access to the headquarters of the Black Panthers on
the condition that he would not disclose anything he saw or heard. Id. at 672. A third also had
information about the Black Panthers obtained on a similar condition. Id. at 675-79.
17. Id. at 687-92. In Branzburg, the Court said the grand jury has a dual function of
determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of
directly related to the purpose of the proceedings. In Herbert, a libel
case, the plaintiff needed certain information to prove his claim.18
The state of mind of the reporters and editors involved was crucial to
the success of his action.' 9 The information, once again, was directly
related to the purpose of the proceedings.
Since Herbert, however, a new type of libel suit has developed.
The primary purpose of this action is to harass and intimidate the
media, rather than to seek compensation for damage to reputation,
historically the central purpose of a libel action.2 0
The new type of libel plaintiff, upon learning that publication of
a story is imminent, seeks to inhibit dissemination by writing a letter
threatening a libel suit,2 ' often without regard to the veracity of the
story.2 2 Even the threat of a suit forces the news organization to de-
cide whether to allocate financial resources to defend the suit or to
capitulate to the threat by declining to publish or by altering story
content.2 3 Since a significant portion of defense costs relate to discov-
protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Id. at 686-87.
18. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text for an examination of the Herbert
majority opinion.
19. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 170-73.
20. In Herbert, the Court, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote: "If a man
sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other justifi-
cation than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of tort will
make him liable, if the statements are false or are true only of some one else." Id. (quoting
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909)).
21. See Abrams, Why We Should Change The Libel Law, New York Times, Sept. 29,
1985, § 6 (magazine) at 34. Abrams offers a textbook example of the impact of a threatening
letter on publication. Two scientists attempted to publish a study concerning alleged ethical
breaches by several prominent scientists. Id. at 87, 90. Publishers reportedly refused to publish
the study not because the truth of the study was in question, but because the publishers re-
ceived several letters threatening libel suits if the study was published. Id. at 90. The publish-
ers feared the cost of defending the suit. Id. See also Laxalt v. McClatchy, No. CV-R-84-407
(D. Nev. Sept. 21, 1984). In that case, Senator Paul Laxalt filed a 250 million dollar libel suit
against McClatchy newspapers for a story stating that a casino owned by Laxalt skimmed
profits, and that Laxalt supporters had connections with organized crime. Washington Post,
Jan. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Before McClatchy published the stories, both ABC and CBS were
considering broadcasting similar reports. Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1984 at 56, col. 1. Both de-
clined, however, after Laxalt's attorney wrote letters to both networks questioning the reliabil-
ity of a source. Although news executives for the networks claimed the stories were not aired
for editorial reasons, two unidentified ABC employees said the stories were pulled because of
the letter from Laxalt's lawyer. Id.
22. In Olsen v. Allen, No. 84-2-10811-8 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. filed July 30,
1984), author Jack Olsen alleged that attorneys for the subjects of his book, Son: A Psycho-
path and His Victims, wrote a letter threatening a libel suit against THE LADIEs HOME JOUR-
NAL if the magazine published excerpts of the book. Olsen, Complaint for Damages at 3. Olsen
charged that the attorneys had read neither a manuscript of the book nor the excerpts. Olsen,
Complaint for Damages at 3. Olsen contended that the magazine had agreed to publish ex-
cerpts of the book before the letter was written, but that after receiving the letter the maga-
zine decided not to publish. Olsen, Complaint for Damages at 2-3.
23. The average cost of defending a libel suit is estimated to be $150,000. Baer, THE
AM. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 69. It has also been estimated that CBS spent seven to eight million
dollars defending the Westmoreland suit, and that Time, Inc. spent five to seven million dollars
defending the Sharon suit. Id. The high cost of defending libel suits has a particular impact on
small news organizations with few assets. See infra note 26.
ery, '2 4 an exhaustive round of discovery may make the cost of defense
prohibitive. 5 In many instances, the decision to publish is based on
the financial position of the news organization and not the accuracy
and importance of the story.26
More problems arise if a party actually brings a libel suit, be-
cause compliance with discovery requests generally disrupts the news
gathering process. 27 Staff depositions are time consuming, and dis-
covery requests concerning information held by reporters and editors
require staff time to dig through notes, papers, and photos to find the
information requested. 28  The problem is particularly acute for
smaller news organizations with few staff members.2" Obviously, if a
news organization is forced to allocate a significant part of its staff in
compliance with discovery requests, the primary purpose of the news
organization-to inform the public-will be hampered.
Another related problem rests in determining the appropriate
scope of discovery when an opponent attempts to probe a reporter's
confidential sources. If a reporter has used confidential information,
the plaintiff may request the name of the source. Indeed, some plain-
tiffs bring actions simply to identify an informant rather than to seek
compensation for a damaged reputation.3" If sources cannot hide be-
hind the cloak of confidentiality, they will be less likely to come for-
ward with information.
The public interest demands that the news media should be pro-
tected from discovery in libel litigation that is designed to harass the
24. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
25. Most news organizations cannot afford extensive discovery similar to that used by
attorneys representing CBS in the Westmoreland case. See Baer, THE AM. LAW., Nov. 1985,
at 69. The attorneys in that case had an estimated 35 pounds of indices and 300,000 docu-
ments. Baer, supra note 23, at 69.
26. A weekly newspaper in Iowa published a retraction to appease a disgruntled indi-
vidual who had been the subject of a story, even though the paper knew the story was true.
The paper was forced to retract because the $10,000 deductible in the paper's libel insurance
policy would have bankrupted the newspaper. News Notes, 12 MEDIA L. REP. BNA No. I at 3
(Oct. 1, 1985).
27. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176 n.25. In Herbert, the Court recognized the problem
for small news organizations, but provided no protection for them. Id.
28. The Herbert Court also recognized the impact of discovery on the news gathering
process but, again, did nothing to address the issue. Id.
29. In Herbert, the CBS producer's deposition continued intermittently for more than a
year, filling 26 volumes containing nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits. Id.
30. Although most states' "shield laws" (which insulate reporters from being compelled
to disclose sources of information) apply to defendants in defamation cases, a few states specif-
ically exempt libel and slander defendants. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-44.540 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1-9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980). Following the jailing of reporter Richard Hargraves for refus-
ing to reveal a source in a libel case, see infra note 193, the Illinois shield law was amended
specifically to include libel. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901, 8-902, 8-904, 8-907 (Smith-
Hurd 1984) amended by H.B. 508, enacted Sept. 16, 1985. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recently affirmed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's shield law in libel cases.
Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1985).
defendant or his sources. Standards must be developed to determine
both the legitimacy of the claim and the necessity of obtaining infor-
mation. Yet plaintiffs with legitimate claims must have access to in-
formation necessary to meet their burden of proof. This article will
examine recently developed judicial methods designed to balance the
competing interests of the news media and plaintiffs in libel litiga-
tion. In so doing, the rationales of Herbert, Branzburg, and other
relevant opinions will be explored.
II. The Discovery of Non-Confidential, Non-Published Information
A. The Seminal Case: An Examination of Herbert v. Lando
In Herbert v. Lando,3 ' the United States Supreme Court held
that libel plaintiffs must have access to news organizations' decision
making processes, including information about the state of mind of
reporters and editors."2 The case developed when a producer for the
CBS news program "60 Minutes" refused to answer questions about
his thoughts and opinions concerning a story he produced."3 CBS
claimed a first amendment privilege, arguing that exposing the edito-
rial process to discovery would chill candid discussion between edi-
tors and reporters concerning story veracity. 4 Since inaccuracies
may be ferreted out through discussion, CBS argued that decreased
discussion leads to increased inaccuracies, thereby injuring the pub-
lic interest in access to accurate information. 5
The Court, however, rejected the claim, stating that the privi-
lege would upset the balance struck in New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 6 between the public interest in access to information concern-
ing public officials and figures, and the individual interest in seeking
compensation for damage to reputation." The Court said that recog-
nition of a privilege would substantially interfere with the plaintiff's
ability to prove actual malice,3 8 which requires proof that the news
organization either knew the information was false at the time of
publication, or acted in reckless disregard for the truth. 9 The actual
malice standard requires an examination of the publisher's state of
31. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
32. Id. at 169-70.
33. Id. at 157. The case arose when "60 Minutes" broadcast a story concerning
charges made by retired Army officer Anthony Herbert that his superior officers covered up
reports of atrocities and other war crimes. Id. at 155-56. Herbert alleged that the article
falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a liar and a person who had made war crimes charges
to explain why he was relieved of his command. Id. at 156.
34. Id. at 173-75.
35. Id. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169-72.
38. Id. at 170.
39. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
mind.40 Excluding editors and reporters from the examination
removes a key source of information and may establish an impene-
trable barrier to the success of a plaintiff's claim."
The Court also found the outer boundaries of the privilege diffi-
cult to discern.' 2 CBS said that Lando would answer queries con-
cerning his knowledge, but would not answer questions concerning
his beliefs.' The Court, however, could discern no distinction be-
tween the two."
The Court also rejected the argument that giving a plaintiff ac-
cess to the editorial process would chill communication within news
organizations. 5 The Court acknowledged that although access would
have a chilling effect, only that speech not protected by Sullivan
would be threatened.' 6 Additionally, while the Court recognized that
there is a correlation between increased discovery costs and the cost
of litigation,'47 it said that increases in litigation costs are not pecu-
liar to libel and slander cases.'8 The Court reasoned that district
courts may control the costs of litigating libel and slander suits by
strictly applying the relevance requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.4 9 Accordingly, the Court held that existing safe-
guards adequately protected the public interest in access to
information.
Justice Powell's separate concurrence expanded the discussion
of discovery costs." He admonished district court judges against al-
lowing uncontrolled discovery, particularly where first amendment
rights are involved, 5' and stated that judges should determine the
discoverability of information through the relevance standard.52 Rel-
evance itself should be determined by balancing the public's infor-
mational interest against the plaintiff's need for information. 3
The dissenting justices, however, were concerned with the chil-
ling effect discovery would have on news organizations' decision-
making processes. Justices Brennan and Marshall said a privilege
should be provided.5 4 They agreed that the scope of the privilege
40. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 170.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 170-71.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 171.
46. Id. at 172-73.
47. Id. at 176.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 176-77; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and 26 (c).
50. Id. at 179 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 180.
52. Id. at 179-80.
53. Id.
54. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part), 206 (Marshall, J.,
should include deliberative and policy making processes while ex-
cluding factual material. 55
The two justices disagreed, however, about how much protection
to provide. Justice Brennan argued that the Constitution demands a
qualified privilege.6" He believed that a news organization's decision
making process should be privileged against discovery until the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of defamatory falsehood.5"
Brennan argued that a qualified privilege strikes the proper balance
between protecting newsroom discussion, which enhances the accu-
racy of information,6" and providing the plaintiff with the necessary
information to meet his burden of proof. 9
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, argued for an abso-
lute privilege. He stated that "shielding this limited category of evi-
dence from disclosure would be unlikely to preclude recovery by
plaintiffs with valid defamation claims."60 Both dissenters, accord-
ingly, would have provided some type of protection to the news
media.
Although all of the opinions claim to offer some type of protec-
tion to news organizations, none of the expressed standards suffi-
ciently protect the public interest in access to information. The scope
of the protection recognized in Herbert is limited to the editorial
process, which is a small part of the news gathering process. 1 Under
Herbert, extensive discovery will still inhibit reporters by requiring
them to take the time to comply with plaintiff requests, instead of
spending their working hours gathering information.62 Each opinion
in Herbert dictates that material not involved with the editorial pro-
cess is discoverable upon a very broad showing of relevance.63 A sig-
nificant demonstration of need by the plaintiff is not required.
Although Herbert provides a very limited requirement concern-
ing proof of need by the plaintiff, the decision requires no demon-
stration whatsoever that a libel claim has merit, and has not been
brought merely to harass, retaliate or achieve source disclosure.6"
Only Justice Marshall did not presume that a plaintiff's purpose in
dissenting).
55. See id. at 181, 208-10.
56. Id. at 181.
57. Id. Although Justice Brennan did not define defamatory falsehood, he stated that
the prima facie showing could be made as part of a motion for an order compelling discovery,
or at any other appropriate time. Id. at 198 n.17.
58. Id. at 197.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 209-10.
61. Justice Brennan defined the editorial process as "predecisional communication
among editors." Id. at 181.
62. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
64. None of the opinions would require such a demonstration.
bringing suit is to seek compensation for damage to reputation."
None of the opinions provide adequate protection against litigational
threats designed to harass and intimidate, and which force news or-
ganizations to decide between incurring the risk and expense of de-
fending a costly suit and dropping the news story. The Court's posi-
tion that Sullivan's actual malice standard provides adequate
protection for the press66 is little comfort to a publisher or broad-
caster who cannot afford to pay. 7 If a publisher cannot pay the costs
of defending a threatened suit, Sullivan provides no protection. The
suit itself chills speech. 8
Since the Herbert majority rationale provides inadequate pro-
tection for news organizations, how can protection of non-confiden-
tial, non-published information be accomplished? A standard must
be developed to protect the news media from plaintiff discovery that
inhibits the dissemination of information, while permitting plaintiff
access to relevant information when a legitimate claim exists. The
remaining discussion in this section will review lower court decisions
considering the appropriate level of protection to be accorded this
type of information.
B. Libel Discovery Concerning Non-Confidential Information Fol-
lowing Herbert
Since Herbert, a number of courts have formulated standards to
determine whether libel plaintiffs may discover non-confidential,
non-published information from a news organization defendant.
1. Broad readings of Herbert.-A few courts have read Her-
bert broadly, erecting few barriers to information discoverable by li-
bel plaintiffs.69 The broadest reading is Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle,70 in
which the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a trial court determina-
65. Justice Marshall identified ulterior motives, stating: "Given the circumstances
under which libel actions arise, plaintiff's pretrial maneuvers may be fashioned more with an
eye to deterrence or retaliation than to unearthing germane material." Herbert, 441 U.S. at
204-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although Justice Marshall's opinion provides limited protec-
tion, it is ineffective to inhibit non-meritorious claims, since it covers only the very narrow area
of the editorial process. The opinion provides no protection in other areas, such as the discov-
ery of non-published factual material, where plaintiffs may retaliate via the discovery process
by running up their opponent's attorney's bill.
66. Id. at 170-74.
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. See Abrams, supra note 21. Abrams reports one editor said that it had been "'so-
bering to look' at the 'clear and convincing report,' but that 'we see no feasible way to use it'
because 'both our publisher and our long-time legal adviser believe that the legal costs in-
curred would be prohibitive.' " Id. at 90.
69. See Central New Jersey Jewish Home for the Aged v. New York Times, Co., 183
N.J. Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80 (1981), and Greenleigh Assoc.s, Inc. v. New York Post Corp.,
79 A.D.2d 588, 434 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
70. 226 Kan. 167, 597 P.2d 611 (1979).
tion that information sought by a plaintiff was not relevant. 71 The
court said a trial judge should grant a discovery request "if there is
any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the
subject matter at hand."' 72 The court believed that this breadth of
discovery was necessary to provide the parties with information es-
sential to litigation.
73
The Carlyle standard, however, falls short of the requirements
set out in Herbert. Unlike Herbert, Carlyle does not require a show-
ing of clear relevance.74 Instead, the Carlyle court permits discovery
if any possibility exists that the desired information may be rele-
vant. 75 The Kansas court distinguished the Herbert standard on its
facts, stating that it had "no quarrel with the [Herbert] rule; how-
ever, its application to the case at the bar would be misplaced. 7 6
The court, however, failed to explain clearly why the Herbert rule
should not be applied. 7 Since the Carlyle court failed to apply the
Supreme Court's relevancy requirements, and offered no similar
safeguards, Carlyle provides less discovery protection for the news
media than Herbert.
The Carlyle standard, then, is even more detrimental to the
public interest than Herbert because it places virtually no burden on
the plaintiff to demonstrate need. Almost any type of information
could conceivably be relevant to a plaintiff's case. The standard also
requires no proof of plaintiff's good faith. Any plaintiff who states a
prima facie case has access to the broadest information available.
The net result is that a plaintiff may harass a news organization
through a libel suit by requiring broad discovery, even if the claim is
illegitimate and the need for the information is negligible.
2. The Sliding Scale of Materiality.-In Continental Cablevi-
71. Carlyle, 226 Kan. at 170-71, 597 P.2d at 614.
72. Id. at 170, 597 P.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 170-71, 597 P.2d at 614.
74. It is difficult to discern whether the Herbert Court, in requiring the strict applica-
tion of relevance, intended to derive the standard from the first amendment or the FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177. The distinction is important. If
the first amendment requires strict application of relevance, the standard is binding on the
states. If the requirement is an instruction on application of the FEDERAL RULES, the standard
would only be binding on the federal courts, and states would be free to set standards below its
strict application. The Kansas court therefore may be constitutionally permitted to establish
the lower standard if the Court only intended the standard to be an interpretation of the
FEDERAL RULES. In addition, in neither Central New Jersey Jewish Home for the Aged v.
New York Times, Co., 183 N.J. Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80 (1981), nor Greenleigh Assoc.s, Inc.
v. New York Post Corp., 79 A.D.2d 588, 434 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) does the
respective court define what constitutes relevant evidence. It is therefore impossible to deter-
mine whether these cases fall within Herbert.
75. Carlyle, 226 Kan. at 170-71, 597 P.2d at 614.
76. Id. at 170, 597 P.2d at 614.
77. Id.
sion v. Storer Broadcasting,7 8 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri denied a newspaper's motion to
quash a deposition subpoena, 79 but recognized the detrimental effect
of discovery on the news process.80 Accordingly, the court estab-
lished a standard that protects non-confidential information unless it
is relevant and otherwise unavailable.8' Insofar as the standard re-
quires a demonstration of relevance, it is similar to the Herbert stan-
dard. But the Continental Cable standard defines relevance differ-
ently, requiring a demonstration of material need. Thus, non-
confidential information is better protected under Continental Cable
than under Herbert. But the Continental Cable court gave no guide-
lines explaining what "material need" might encompass.82
Another protective feature of the Continental Cable standard is
that it requires a demonstration that the information is not otherwise
available.8 3 This is known as the alternative source rule. This rule
has the salutary effect of relieving some of the burden placed on
news organizations during discovery by forcing plaintiffs to seek in-
formation from other sources first.8
Even though it uses different language, the Continental Cable
standard is consistent with the policy expressed in Herbert. The Her-
bert relevance requirement is intended to inhibit annoying, embar-
rassing, or oppressive discovery.86 The material need requirement of
Continental Cable likewise implements that policy, although in a
stronger way, by forcing plaintiffs to show exactly how the informa-
tion sought relates to the case. Although Continental Cable requires
that information be sought from alternative sources initially, the pro-
vision does not conflict with the Herbert policy of allowing plaintiffs
to have access to information if they truly need it.88
Although the Continental Cable test provides additional protec-
tion, its provisions are by no means perfect. While some demonstra-
tion of need is required, the standard fails to protect information
that is related only tangentially to a case. Information may be "ma-
terial," but that alone does not mean it is of central importance to a
78. 583 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
79. Id. at 438.
80. Id. at 434-35. The court said: "The first amendment interest in preserving the vital-
ity of the press is implicated any time civil litigants seek discovery or testimony from the
media, regardless of whether confidential or non-confidential sources or materials are sought."
Id. at 434.
81. Id. at 435.
82. Id. at 434.
83. Id. at 435.
84. The alternative source rule is usually applied in confidential source cases. See infra
notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
85. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.
86. Continental Cable, 583 F. Supp. at 435.
plaintiff's case. The information sought may not be of sufficient im-
portance to justify interference with the news gathering process by
requiring a news organization to take the time to comply with the
discovery demand. And, like Herbert, Continental Cable also fails to
require proof of the legitimacy of the claim prior to discovery. Ac-
cordingly, the costs of defense could, still, in terms of money and
potential chilling effect, adversely affect the dissemination of news.
3. Permitting Discovery When the Information Sought is of
"Central Importance" to Plaintiffs Case.-In Marchiondo v.
Brown 8 7 the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a test that pro-
vides better media protection. The court held that information in the
exclusive possession of the defendant is discoverable if it is of central
importance to the plaintiff's case."' Information is of central impor-
tance if refusing discovery would unduly prejudice the plaintiff's
action.8 9
Unfortunately, the decision does not state why the central im-
portance standard is appropriate. The court merely cites passages
from Herbert, states that the plaintiff in Marchiondo should have
access to information held exclusively by the defendant, and recites
that the information sought is of central importance."0 Despite the
lack of explanation by the court, an examination of the standard
demonstrates that it effectively accommodates competing interests.
The ''central importance" requirement limits the scope of discovery,
striking a balance between the competing interests of allowing plain-
tiff access and limiting inconvenience to the news organization. 1
The standard can potentially provide more protection than re-
quired by Herbert. Herbert merely requires the strict application of
the relevance standard,92 and relevance, in the context of discovery,
is broadly interpreted. 93 Marchiondo significantly narrows the scope
of discoverable evidence, precluding inquiry unless exclusion would
unduly prejudice plaintiffs case.94 Some relevant evidence, therefore,
87. 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982).
88. Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at __, 649 P.2d at 467; see Williams v. American Broad-
casting Co, 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983). In Williams, the court required plaintiff to
prove that the information was needed to prove a critical element of the case before it ordered
discovery. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 668-70.
89. See Mize v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475, 477-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
90. Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at - , 649 P.2d at 467. Plaintiff was seeking to discover
the party responsible for writing a headline and using a photo of him as part of a story discuss-
ing the infiltration of organized crime in New Mexico. Id. at -, 649 P.2d at 465. Plaintiff
said he needed to know who made the decision in order to determine whether the publication
was made with actual malice. Id.
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.
93. Id.; see Carlyle, 226 Kan. at 170-71, 597 P.2d at 614.
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
is not discoverable under Marchiondo although it would be discover-
able under Herbert.
Marchiondo also provides more protection than the material
need standard of Continental Cable because information that is ma-
terially needed will in most cases exceed information which, if ex-
cluded, would unduly prejudice plaintiff's case. But Continental
Cable's alternative source rule exceeds Marchiondo because Mar-
chiondo requires no proof of attempts to obtain the information
through alternative sources. As with Herbert and Continental Cable,
Marchiondo does not examine the nature of the claim to determine
its legitimacy. News organizations may, therefore, still be harassed
by illegitimate claims, although the scope of harassment is
decreased.
4. Permitting Broad Discovery After a Determination of the
Merit of a Claim.-The preceding standards, while providing differ-
ent levels of review, are similar in focus in that they are concerned
with the type of information sought. All of these approaches fail to
examine the need for discovery from the opposite point of view -
whether or not the claim itself is legitimate. In McBride v. Dow,95
the D.C. Circuit held that trial courts should determine whether a
claim has merit before allowing broad discovery. 9 Until such a de-
termination is made, discovery is to be limited, where feasible, only
to information that may sustain a summary judgment.97 The Mc-
Bride court reasoned that this preliminary evaluation of the merits
may inhibit suits brought to harass rather than to seek compensation
for reputational damage. 98 McBride also evidences an interest in pro-
moting judicial economy because it provides a mechanism to permit
plaintiffs to conduct discovery for the limited purpose of allowing a
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.99
The D.C. Circuit's decision at first appears to fall within the
dictates of the Herbert majority and the Powell concurrence,' ° but
in fact significantly deviates from Herbert's focus. Herbert does not
address the nature or motivation of the claim.1 1 Rather, it addresses
the scope of discovery during the claim and presumes, without ex-
95. 717 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
96. McBride v. Merrell Dow and Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d at 1467.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1461. Judge Bork, writing for Judges Wright and McKinnon, said: "The
ability to frame a pleading that defeats, however narrowly, a motion to dismiss ought not to be
converted into a license to harass. We suggest, therefore, that the district court proceed upon
remand in a manner that will minimize, so far as practicable, the burden a possibly meritless
claim is capable of imposing upon free and vigorous journalism." Id. at 1461-62.
99. Id. at 1467.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
plicitly stating, that the claim has some merit.10 By allowing discov-
ery only after proof of merit, 10 3 the D.C. Circuit opinion leans closer
to Brennan's dissent in Herbert,04 which would require a prima fa-
cie showing of defamatory falsehood before allowing discovery re-
garding the editorial process of the news organization.10 5 Yet, Bren-
nan's dissent further limits the type of allowable discovery. It would
make available only the editorial discussion of the allegedly defama-
tory information,106 while factual material would be discoverable
without the prima facie showing. 07 The D.C. Circuit's approach spe-
cifically limits discovery to information that may sustain a determi-
nation of summary judgment prior to an assessment of the merits of
the claim.
Although McBride gives more protection at the initial stage
than Brennan's approach, it fails to provide protection for defendants
after merit is demonstrated. The court permits broad discovery, but
requires no showing of need for information by the plaintiff.10 8 Plain-
tiffs may therefore disrupt the news dissemination process through
extensive discovery even if there is little need for the information or
if the information may be obtained from other sources.
C. Balancing Competing Interests
Libel actions entail a clash of competing interests. Because ac-
tual malice under Sullivan requires proof of a particular state of
mind, public figure and public official plaintiffs must have access to
the decision-making process of the news media. 109 Fairness also re-
quires that plaintiffs have access to factual information important to
their case." 0 But since unrestricted access to non-confidential, non-
published information can disrupt and chill the dissemination of in-
formation,"' courts have been struggling with formulating an appro-
priate standard to accommodate these competing interests. Unfortu-
nately, none of the standards formulated in Herbert, Continental
Cable, Marchiondo, and McBride, standing alone, sufficiently strike
a balance. A combination of the standards developed in these cases,
however, would appropriately balance the interests involved.
A court should first make a threshold determination to see if the
102. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155.
103. McBride, 717 F.2d at 1467.
104. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 180-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 197.
106. Id. at 181.
107. Id.
108. McBride, 717 F.2d at 1467.
109. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
110. Id.
Ill. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
claim before it has merit. 1 ' The McBride approach provides suffi-
cient protection in this area. It allows sufficient discovery to deter-
mine whether summary judgment is appropriate."' At the same
time, meritless suits can be winnowed out, decreasing defense costs
while lessening the inhibitory effect that libel litigation has on news
dissemination.
After the merits of the claim have been determined, the plain-
tiff's need for information should be considered. First, a court should
determine whether the information goes to the heart of the plaintiff's
claim." 4 Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the information is
not reasonably available from other sources." 5 These standards de-
crease the time and expense to news organizations, while still al-
lowing plaintiffs access to information necessary to their claim.
III. The Discovery of Confidential Sources in a Libel Suit
It is often necessary for a reporter working on a sensitive story
to gather information from confidential sources." 6 The confidential
source provides information to the reporter on the condition that the
source not be identified. 1 7 In many instances, the only way to get
information is to promise confidentiality." 8 It is understandable that
news organizations prefer not to disclose confidential sources when
their reporters have promised confidentiality, because disclosure,
without authorization from the source, may inhibit the future use of
this method of gathering information." 9 The public's interest in ac-
cess to information would therefore be adversely affected by com-
pelled disclosure of confidential sources.'
Competing interests, however, may require disclosure. For in-
stance, the plaintiff may argue that the identity of a source may be
necessary to establish that published information is true or to evalu-
ate the reliability of the source.' 2' This section will examine these
competing interests and will determine what type of protection
should be offered to confidential sources in the libel setting.
112. See McBride, 717 F.2d 1460; see also supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
113. McBride, 717 F.2d at 1467.
114. See Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at - , 649 P.2d at 467.
115. See Continental Cable, 583 F. Supp. at 434.
116. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 268, -, 690 P.2d 625, 628, 208 Cal. Rptr.
152, 155 (1984).
117. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972).
118. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
119. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 714.
A. Protection of Confidential Sources Generally: A United States
Supreme Court View
In Branzburg v. Hayes,12 2 the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the concept of a reporter's privilege in a federal grand jury
setting.' The Court, however, was divided. Justice White, writing
for three other justices, found no privilege in a grand jury setting. 12
He did not consider whether a privilege might exist in different cir-
cumstances. 12 5 Justice Powell concurred in the holding ordering dis-
closure, stating that disclosure could be compelled if the source of
the information was relevant to a criminal investigation. 2
Justice Stewart, writing for two other justices, dissented, stating
that a reporter can only be required to disclose the identity of a
source if three factors are established: 1) probable cause to believe
that the reporter has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; 2) the information sought cannot be ob-
tained by alternative means less destructive of first amendment
rights; and 3) a compelling interest that requires disclosure.
21 7
All of the opinions in Branzburg were limited to examination of
the issue of disclosing a confidential source in a criminal setting.1
2 8
The public has a strong interest in ensuring that criminal activity is
punished. 29 The public, however, also has an interest in access to
information, which would tend to preclude disclosure of confidential
sources. 130 The question of a reporter's privilege in a criminal setting
would therefore place two distinct public interests at odds.' 3 ' After
weighing these interests, the Branzburg Court struck a balance in
favor of law enforcement and ordered disclosure.1
3 2
Whether Branzburg applies in a civil context is unclear. In a
libel setting, no such societal interest favors disclosure because an
122. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
123. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
124. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 708-09; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
125. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. Justice White, writing for the Court, narrowed the
holding stating: "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify
before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by
the First Amendment." Id.
126. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented separately but did
not develop a standard of review. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting). A number of courts have
interpreted the plurality opinion in Branzburg as creating a reporter's privilege. See, e.g.,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Carey v.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 417 U.S. 938 (1973); and Zerilli v. Smith,
656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
128. The Justices, of course, were limited to a criminal setting by the facts of the cases.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-80.
129. Id. at 696.
130. Id. at 681.
131. Id. at 682.
132. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
individual brings the action to seek redress for damage to his reputa-
tion.1 3 3 Society's interest would seem to demand source protection to
promote the free flow of information."" Libel cases, therefore, re-
quire a different balance of equities than that undertaken in
Branzburg.
Herbert is also distinguishable because the privilege claimed in
that case was not a reporter's privilege, but rather a privilege for the
editorial process.135 The distinction between the two is found in the
type of information that may be affected. The editorial privilege does
not concern actual information disseminated.1 36 It concerns the dis-
cussion and thoughts of the editors and reporters when deciding
whether to disseminate information.'37 The reporter's privilege, in
contrast, involves information obtained during newsgathering for the
purpose of dissemination.1
38
Neither Branzburg nor Herbert address the issue of whether the
identity of confidential sources should be protected in a libel setting.
This section, therefore, will examine methods developed by lower
courts to decide this issue, and will develop a conclusion regarding
whether confidential source protection should be offered in news
media libel cases.
B. Methods of Deciding Libel Discovery Cases Involving Confiden-
tial Sources
Since Branzburg, courts have dealt with the question of whether
a defendant reporter should be compelled to disclose the identity of
confidential sources in libel cases. This section will discuss various
standards that have been developed.
1. No Privilege Upon a Showing of a Genuine Issue of Fact
Regarding the Falsity of Publication.-Several courts have adopted
standards that require a minimal showing to compel disclosure. 39
133. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169.
134. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
135. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155.
136. Id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
139. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980)
(holding that relevance provides sufficient protection of confidential sources); Sierra Life Ins. v.
Magic Valley Newspapers, 101 Idaho 795. 623 P.2d 103 (1980) (following Herbert in requir-
ing a mere showing of relevance to gain access to the identity of confidential sources); Gagnon
v. Dist. Court In & For City of Fremont, - Colo. __, 632 P.2d 567 (1981) (holding that
a demonstration of relevance is sufficient to order disclosure of identity of confidential source);
and Georgia Communications Corp. v. Horne, 164 Ga. App. 227, 294 S.E.2d 725 (1982)
(holding, under Branzburg, that no constitutional privilege exists). Reliance on Herbert for the
proposition that the Constitution does not provide a reporter's privilege is misplaced, because
the Herbert opinion does not address a confidential source question. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 181
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. Reliance on
The standard developed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Downing v. Monitor Publishing40 is representative of these. In
Downing, the court held that the identity of a confidential source
must be disclosed after plaintiff has made an offer of proof that a
genuine issue of fact regarding falsity exists.141 The court reasoned
that the United States Supreme Court had provided sufficient pro-
tection for the press in New York Times v. Sullivan."4 2 Additional
press protection would place too much of a burden on plaintiffs, the
court said, citing Herbert.
14 3
But the court's reliance on Herbert is misplaced because the
court failed to distinguish the editorial privilege operating in Herbert
from the reporter's privilege in Downing. The Herbert decision was
grounded on what the Court found to be the necessary examination
of thoughts and discussion during the editorial process."4 In libel
cases, the identity of a source may have only a tangential relation-
ship to the case. In addition, alternative sources of information may
be available.
Although the Downing court rejected the creation of a privilege,
it claims to offer "some safeguard . . . to prevent an order of dis-
closure". 4" But the safeguard is tenuous at best, because the court
will assess the claim's legitimacy but will not require some demon-
stration of a need to obtain information."" The Downing approach
therefore permits any plaintiff able to make an offer of proof that a
genuine issue of falsity exists to seek the identity of a confidential
source.147 Under such a rule, a potential source who wishes to re-
main anonymous will think twice before disclosing information to a
reporter.
2. Information must go to the Heart of the Issue.-In Mize v.
McGraw Hill,1 48 a United States district court held that a plaintiff
must prove that the information sought goes to the heart of the
claim before disclosure will be compelled." 9 To meet that burden,
Branzburg is also misplaced, because that decision did not involve a libel case, but rather
grand jury proceedings. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
140. 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980).
141. Downing v. Monitor Publishing, 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686.
142. Downing, 120 N.H. at 385-86, 415 A.2d at 685; see supra notes 37-39 and accom-
panying text for an examination of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
143. Downing, 120 N.H. at 386-87, 415 A.2d at 685-86.
144. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
145. Downing, 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686.
146. In this area, Downing differs from cases requiring only a demonstration of rele-
vancy. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. The relevance requirement focuses on the
need for the information, yet fails to examine whether the claim is meritorious.
147. Downing, 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686.
148. 82 F.R.D. 475 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
149. Mize, 82 F.R.D. at 477; see Liberty Lobby Inc. v. Anderson, 96 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C.
1982); Application of Dack, 101 Misc. 2d 490, 421 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co.
the plaintiff must prove that his case will be cognizably prejudiced if
the information is not disclosed. 150 The court said that "mere specu-
lation or conjecture about the fruits of such examination simply will
not suffice"' 15 and stated that the "heart of the claim" standard
properly balanced the interests of all parties involved. It protects the
interests of news organizations and the public by providing a level of
protection for confidential information, while allowing plaintiffs to
have access to information central to their cases. 52
In recognizing the importance of confidential sources to the dis-
semination of information, the heart of the isiue approach differs
from the genuine issue of falsity standard, which merely screens out
non-meritorious claims.1 s The genuine issue standard provides no
protection for confidential sources involved in meritorious claims that
are only tangentially related to the case.""
But the heart of the issue standard is not flawless. The balanc-
ing approach places the private interest in gaining information on
the same plane as the public interest, and fails to account for occa-
sions where the public may have an overriding interest in protecting
confidentiality. 55 In other words, the approach assumes the public
interest in confidentiality and overrides it when the private interest
reaches a prejudicial level. The approach fails to evaluate the public
interest in each specific circumstance to determine if, regardless of
the prejudicial impact on plaintiff's case, the public interest in non-
disclosure should prevail. The standard, therefore, may not be as
flexible as it appears. But there are other standards available for
those jurisdictions seeking to provide strong protection for the public
interest.
3. The Three-Part Test.-A number of jurisdictions have
adopted a three-part test for confidential source disclosure. 156 Al-
though the precise test varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most
tests are similar to the test that the Fifth Circuit adopted in Miller
1979). A number of courts have interpreted state shield laws to provide protection unless the
information goes to the heart of the claim. See Taylor v. Miskovsky, 7 Media L. Rep. 2408
(Okla. 1981); Aerial Burials v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 8 Media L. Rep. 1653 (4th
Dist. D.C. Minn. 1982); and Weiss v. Thomson Newspapers, 8 Media L. Rep. 1258 (D.C.
Licking Co. Ohio 1981).
150. Mize, 82 F.R.D. at 477.
151. Id. (quoting Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972)).
152. Mize, 82 F.R.D. at 477.
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 153.
155. See Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
156. See In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); Semlich v. Herald Co., No. 84-
281C(5) (E.D. Mo. 1985); Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broadcasting, 583 F. Supp.
427 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1983); Gadsden County
Times, Inc. v. Horne, 426 So.2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); and Resorts Int'l v. NJM
Assoc.s, 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 572 (1981).
v. Trans American. 57 In Trans American, the court held that before
confidential source disclosure could be compelled, a plaintiff must
prove by substantial evidence: 1) that the challenged statement was
published and is both factually untrue and defamatory; 2) that rea-
sonable efforts to discover the information from alternative sources
have been made and that no reasonable source is available; and 3)
that knowledge of the informant's identity is necessary to the proper
preparation of the case.1 58
The protection the Trans American test provides is comprehen-
sive, focusing on both the claim's merit and the need for the infor-
mation. The first part of the test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that his claim is meritorious.159 The court has provided an effective
obstacle to plaintiffs filing libel suits merely to discover the identity
of a confidential source. If there is no reputational damage, there is
no access to confidential sources via the discovery process. Further
protection is provided by the requirement that the demonstration be
made by substantive evidence. A mere statement by the plaintiff that
the published information is untrue and defamatory will not
suffice.' 60
The second part of the test evaluates the potential sources of
information available to the plaintiff. Plaintiff must attempt to dis-
cover the information from alternative sources through reasonable
efforts.1 61 If there is another available source of information, the
plaintiff's interest will be served without disrupting the public inter-
est in protecting the confidentiality of sources.' 6 If there is no alter-
157. 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980).
158. Miller, 628 F.2d at 932. Originally, the court stated the three-part test as: 1) Is the
information relevant to the case?; 2) Have alternative sources been exhausted?; and 3) Is there
a compelling interest in the information? Miller, 621 F.2d at 726. The court did not explain
the change.
159. The examination of the merit of the claim is the most important change in the test
as initially formulated by the court. Originally, the court required a showing of relevance.
Miller, 621 F.2d at 726. But relevance has nothing to do with the merit of a claim, since
information may be relevant to a claim even if the claim itself is meritless. The original test,
therefore, provided no protection against meritless claims. Similarly, three courts adopting
three-part tests have failed to provide protection against meritless claims. See Semlich v. Her-
ald Co., No. 84-281C(5) (E.D. Mo. 1985); Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broadcast-
ing, 583 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Resorts Int'l v. NJM Assoc.s, 180 N.J. Super. 459,
435 A.2d 572 (1981). One court provides minimal protection requiring that a claim not be
frivolous, Dowd, 577 F. Supp. at 241 n.7, while two courts strictly follow the Trans American
test. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983), and Gadsden County Times Inc. v. Horne,
426 So.2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
160. Miller, 628 F.2d at 932. The defamatory and untrue nature of the article must be
demonstrated by substantial evidence. Id.
161. Id. Every court adopting a three-part test includes an alternative source component.
See supra note 156.
162. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 745 (Stewart, J., dissenting). As Justice Stewart wrote:
It is an obvious but important truism that when government aims have been
fully served, there can be no legitimate reason to disrupt a confidential relation-
ship between a reporter and his source. To do so would not aid the administra-
native source, and a plaintiff can meet the other parts of the test, the
plaintiff is permitted to discover the source's identity.0 3
In the third part of the test, the plaintiff must prove that knowl-
edge of the informant's identity is essential to the proper preparation
of the case.164 Although the court does not define necessary or proper
preparation,'" the definition probably turns on whether lack of ac-
cess to the source's identity would preclude the demonstration of a
prima facie case.' 66 Information would neither be necessary, nor
would proper preparation be threatened, if denial of disclosure would
not foreclose the chances of the plaintiff proving his claim.
The three-part Trans American test provides greater protection
than the previous two tests examined. The first part of the test alone
provides greater protection than the factual issue of falsity test. 167
Part one of the Trans American test requires not only an offer of
proof of a factual issue of falsity, but a demonstration through sub-
stantial evidence of publication of a statement that is both factually
untrue and defamatory.'" Mere speculation through an offer of
proof would not suffice.
The second and third parts of the Trans American test provide
more protection than the heart of the claim standard.' 9 While some
courts require a proof of exhaustion of alternative sources before
considering the heart of the claim issue, 17  most do not require a
high degree of need in order for plaintiffs to obtain confidential in-
formation.17 ' The heart of the claim test eliminates the ability to
discover a confidential source's identity with regard to tangential is-
sues, 7 1 though information relevant to the central issue is discovera-
ble.'M The third part of the Trans American test, however, requires
tion of justice and would only impair the flow of information to the public. Thus,
it is to avoid deterrence of such sources that I think the government must show
that there are no alternative means for the grand jury to obtain the information
sought.
Id. Justice Stewart's rationale is even more forceful in libel cases where the government is not
a party to the action and the only societal interest involved is the dissemination of information.
163. Miller, 628 F.2d at 932.
164. Id. Originally, the third part of the test was whether there is a compelling interest
in obtaining the information. Miller, 621 F.2d at 726. Although the modified opinion is
clearer, the application of the third part of the test is the same, since any litigant has a com-
pelling interest in information if the denial of access would inhibit proper preparation neces-
sary to prove his case.
165. See Miller, 628 F.2d at 932.
166. See Mize, 82 F.R.D. at 478.
167. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
168. Miller, 628 F.2d at 932.
169. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
170. See Mize, 82 F.R.D. at 477.
171. See Application of Dack, 101 Misc.2d 490, 500, 421 N.Y.S. 775, 782 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Co. 1979).
172. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
173. See Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at -, 690 P.2d at 632, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
demonstration of necessity; prejudice alone is not enough' 74 The test
requires that the source's identity be withheld unless preventing dis-
closure would preclude plaintiff's claim.
As with the heart of the issue standard, it appears that the
Trans American test is to be applied mechanically. It establishes a
test to protect the public interest and provides a system for the indi-
vidual plaintiff to overcome that interest, but fails to reexamine the
public interest once the plaintiff has met the required burden. As a
result, the public interest may be subordinated to the private inter-
est, even if the public interest is superior.
4. The California Approach.-In 1984, the California Su-
preme Court adopted the most comprehensive test for protecting the
identity of confidential sources short of providing an absolute privi-
lege. In Mitchell v. Superior Court,175 the court adopted a five-part
test to determine whether confidential information or sources should
be disclosed. 76 To compel disclosure, California courts must con-
sider: 1) whether the reporter is a party to the litigation; 2) whether
the information goes to the heart of the claim; 3) whether alternative
sources have been exhausted; 4) whether the public interest overrides
the private interest in disclosure; and 5) whether the plaintiffs have
made a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood.
Two parts of the California test - alternative sources and heart
of the claim provisions - have been previously examined.' 78 The
California court has said the first part of the test defines the scope of
the privilege.'7  Disclosure is more appropriate if a reporter or news
organization is a party to the litigation, 80 and especially if the party
reporter has confidential information that will effectively prevent a
finding of liability.' 8 ' According to the court, actual malice cases are
particularly appropriate for disclosure if a plaintiff must show reck-
lessness,' 82 because, to prove recklessness, a plaintiff may have to
show a source was unreliable.' 83 To demonstrate lack of reliability,
the plaintiff may need to know the identity of the source.' 8" Disclos-
ure, therefore, might be appropriate since plaintiff's case may other-
174. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
175. 37 CaI.3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984).
176. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 632-35, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-62.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 148-55 and 161-63 and accompanying text.






wise be jeopardized.18 5 But the court notes that demonstration of po-
tential need is not enough.' 86 Other interests must be balanced
before a decision can be made.
One of those interests is preventing non-meritorious claims.18
The Mitchell test requires plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing
that the statements at the root of the claim are defamatory and
false.' 88 The California approach also requires courts to consider the
importance of the public interest involved after the plaintiff has met
the requirements demonstrating need. 189 If compelling disclosure in-
hibits the future disclosure of information that is of significant im-
portance to the public, the public interest may override the private
interest even if the plaintiff's claim is precluded.90 The California
approach, therefore, departs from the mechanical nature of other ap-
proaches since it requires ad hoc balancing in every case, instead of
strict application of a test.' 9 ' The flexibility of the California ap-
proach sets it apart from other standards of review.
IV. Penalties for Failure to Disclose Information
Even when judges order news organizations to disclose informa-
tion or cooperate in discovery procedures, some refuse to do so. In
those situations, courts attempt to craft remedies designed to either
encourage disclosure or preclude those violating discovery orders
from profiting from the information they refuse to disclose.' 92 Al-
though some courts hold reporters in contempt of court and order
incarceration for refusal to comply with discovery orders, 9 3 incarcer-
ation is often ineffective because many journalists are willing to go to
jail rather than divulge information. 94 Usually, libel proceedings
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 20-26 and 29-30 and accompanying text for an examination of the
problems involved when discovery is permitted when a libel claim lacks merit.
188. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at - , 690 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The court
states that there is a great public interest in the truthful revelation of wrongdoing and in
protecting the whistleblower from retaliation, but there is very little public interest in protect-
ing the source of false accusations of wrongdoing. Id. The court, however, qualifies the lan-
guage, stating that "[a] showing of falsity is not a prerequisite to discovery, but it may be
essential to tip the balance in favor of discovery." Id. But the court does not say in what
circumstances falsity must be demonstrated to tip the balance.
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191. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
192. See Sierra Life Ins. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, 101 Idaho 795, 799, 623 P.2d
103, 107 (1980).
193. See Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., No. 81-L-10 (Cir. Ct. St. Clair County,
Ill. May 23, 1984), applic. denied Hargraves v. Scrivner, 52 U.S.L.W. 3928, (U.S. July 2,
1984) (No. A-1027).
194. See Downing, 415 A.2d at 686. The court said that sending a journalist to jail in no
way helps the plaintiff to prove his case: "Although we do not say that the contempt power
should not be exercised, we do say that something more is required to protect the rights of a
provide judges with alternatives to incarceration since the reporter or
news organization is a party to the suit. 19 5 This section will review
those alternatives and suggest which alternative is an appropriate
remedy to impose.
A. Entering Default Judgment
Perhaps the harshest alternative to incarceration is entering a
default judgment against the news organization. In Georgia Commu-
nications v. Home,'96 a Georgia intermediate appellate court, citing
state statutory law, 9 7 upheld a trial court's default judgment entered
after a reporter would not comply with an order to disclose the iden-
tity of a confidential source.1 98 The reporter argued that the default
judgment was excessive punishment for a good-faith attempt to exer-
cise a constitutional right.1" The court rejected the argument, stat-
ing that the reporter intentionally sought a confrontation with the
court and disobeyed its orders.2 00
But the default judgment remedy has been criticized as a viola-
tion of due process.2 01 In Hovey v. Elliott,202 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the imposition of a default judgment for fail-
ure to obey an order to produce evidence could constitute a denial of
due process.20 s In addition, the failure to produce evidence may only
be an admission of the lack of merit of a single defense.20 4 There
may be several other defenses available to a party that should not be
foreclosed.0 Entering a default judgment precludes a party from
offering those defenses and accordingly may violate due process.
In considering whether a default judgment is an appropriate
sanction, courts should be mindful of the purpose of sanctions. They
may be appropriate for the purpose of insuring that a defendant does
not profit from his refusal to provide information °.2 6 But sanctions
are not appropriate punishment for contempt. 7 If alternative de-
libel plaintiff." Id.
195. Judges have few options other than contempt when a journalist is not a party to the
proceedings, since the journalist has no apparent stake in the outcome of the proceedings.
196. 164 Ga. App. 227, 294 S.E.2d 725 (1982).
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203. Hovey, 167 U.S. at 415.
204. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
205. This is particularly true in a libel case where, for example, there may be questions
of whether the statement was published, was actually defamatory, or concerned the plaintiff.
206. Sierra Life, 101 Idaho at 799, 623 P.2d at 107.
207. Id. It is clear that the Georgia court in Georgia Communications used sanctions as
punishment. The trial court gave two reasons for striking the pleadings. First,
the violation committed was willful, conscious, deliberate, flagrant and truculent.
fenses, unrelated to the allegedly privileged information, are availa-
ble, then default judgment is probably in violation of due process.
B. The No Source Presumption
An alternative which more directly addresses the issue is the
declaration that no source exists when a news organization refuses to
comply with a discovery order."°8 A "no source presumption" pre-
cludes a news organization from profiting from its refusal to com-
ply209 since under the no source rule, a news organization cannot use
any evidence gathered from that source to prove that the published
story was accurate.21 0 At the same time, the no source presumption
allows a news organization to assert other defenses and privileges.
But the problem with the no source presumption is that it
removes the decision-making function from the finder of fact. A
news organization cannot place its reporter on the stand to testify
that the information was gathered from a confidential source. The
jury, in turn, cannot decide whether the journalist is telling the
truth.
The rule may also raise a presumption that may not be true. If
the news organization, in fact, has a source, the no source presump-
tion places the court in a position of telling the jury something that
is not accurate. If opposing counsel suspects that the reporter may be
lying when he states that he has a source, counsel can place that
reporter on the stand and ask him to state, under oath, whether a
source exists. This traditional protection against false testimony pro-
vides the proper remedy for refusal to comply with a discovery order.
C. Precluding the Introduction of Evidence Gathered from the
Source
A third alternative to incarceration is for a judge to prohibit the
introduction of evidence gathered from an unidentified confidential
source.21 Under this method, a reporter may testify that information
was gathered from a confidential source.212 The jury may evaluate
Mr. Williams appeared to desire a confrontation with the court and, by his own
testimony, had long before the hearing made the decision not to obey the court's
order . . . . Secondly, defendant . . . stated that he would never obey the order
of the court ....
Georgia Communications, 164 Ga. App. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 726.
208. Downing, 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686; see DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F.
Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981).
209. The Downing court phrased the interest differently, stating that the rights of the
libel plaintiff would be protected. Downing, 120 N.H. at 387, 415 A.2d at 686.
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211. Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 708-09, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 997 (App. Div. 2d
Dept. 1979).
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whether or not the reporter is telling the truth. But the news organi-
zation may not introduce any evidence obtained from that source.
213
Therefore, the news organization does not profit from its refusal to
obey an order to disclose. The jury, however, is told of the circum-
stances under which certain information was gathered and can de-
cide whether the circumstances were reliable or credible.
D. Balancing Competing Interests
Two competing and compelling interests are involved in decid-
ing what type of action to take when a news organization or reporter
refuses to disclose the identity of a confidential source. Should a
news organization be permitted to use information from a source it
refuses to disclose and to which the plaintiff has no access? Should
the finder of fact be denied access to information that is both rele-
vant and true?
The standard that best balances these interests precludes the
admission of evidence gathered from a source, but allows a reporter
to testify that he indeed has a source. The standard protects plain-
tiffs from a defendant's use of evidence gathered from a source
plaintiffs cannot evaluate. Yet, it allows facts tending to prove that
the information was not fabricated to be placed before the trier of
fact. The trier of fact may then make an independent assessment of
the veracity of the reporter's testimony and may either conclude that
a confidential source existed, or that there was no source.
V. Conclusion
This article has examined whether non-confidential, non-pub-
lished information and the identity of confidential sources should be
discoverable in a media libel case. Three conclusions can be drawn.
First, non-confidential, non-published information should never
be discoverable unless the plaintiff has shown, at a minimum, that
the claim has merit, that the information sought goes to the heart of
the claim, and that reasonable alternative sources have been ex-
hausted. This test sufficiently balances the public interest in access to
information, facilitated by source nondisclosure, against the private
interest of having access to information to prove a claim.
Second, the identity of confidential sources should be discovera-
ble only if the plaintiff has shown that the reporter is a party to the
action, that the information goes to the heart of the claim, that alter-
native sources have been exhausted, that the published statements
were defamatory and untrue, and that the private need for disclosure
213. Id.
exceeds the public interest in confidentiality. This test also strikes a
balance between the public interest in access to information provided
by confidential sources and the private interest in access to informa-
tion to prove a libel claim.
Third, if a defendant news organization fails to comply with a
discovery order to provide information sought by a libel plaintiff, the
court should allow testimony that information was provided by a
confidential source, but may prohibit the admission of evidence pro-
vided by the source. This remedy prevents a news organization from
profiting from its refusal to obey the court, yet allows it to assert
other defenses. It permits the trier of fact to perform its traditional
duty of determining the credibility of witnesses and decreases the
probability that inaccurate information, in the form of a false pre-
sumption, will be placed before the jury.
